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This article discusses (and criticizes) the recent change from "shall" to "should" in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 to describe the standard by which a federal district court is to decide a "properly made and
supported" motion for summary judgment. The article concludes that the text of Rule 56, which formally
provided that such a motion "shall" be granted, cannot plausibly be construed as meaning "should"; that this
change was not supported by those authorities cited by the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee; and that,
as a normative matter, "should" is an inappropriate standard in this context. Federal district courts generally
should not have the discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment, and current Rule 56 should
be amended accordingly.
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“Courts must apply judgment, to be sure. But judgment is not discretion.” 1
INTRODUCTION
On December 1, 2007, the long-awaited “restyling” of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure finally took effect.2 The primary purpose of

∗ Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. I thank Amanda
Frost and Stephen Vladeck for allowing me to present this Article at the April 4,
2008, Junior Federal Courts Faculty Workshop at American University, Washington
College of Law. I also thank W. Bryant Flippo, Florida Coastal School of Law class of
2008, for his research assistance.
1. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2515 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the Restyle Project was to bring greater clarity and consistency to the
Substantive change generally was to be avoided.4
Rules.3
Nonetheless, given the breadth of the Restyle Project—in which no
rule was unaffected5—the extent of the change was considerable.
Doubtless, it will take years for the bench and bar to assimilate the
new terminology.
Whether the Restyle Project was worthwhile is debatable.
Certainly, some changes of this nature were desirable; many of the

2. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (U.S. 2007),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv07p.pdf. The
restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) actually was accomplished
in four parts. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 3,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1106/Excerpt_JC_Report_CV_0906.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 4, 2008). In concert with the restyling of the Rules themselves, the
Illustrative Forms that accompany the Rules also were restyled. Id. at 4. Moreover,
some of the revisions made in the course of restyling were regarded as possibly
resulting in “substantive” (as well as stylistic) changes. Those revisions were
separated from the more general restyling revisions, but they became effective on the
same date. See id. at 3. Finally, stylistic changes made to Rules added or amended
effective December 1, 2006, also were completed as a separate set. Id. at 3–4.
Collectively, these revisions will hereinafter be referred to as the “Restyle Project.”
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Rules in this Article are to the
current, restyled Rules.
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (“The language of Rule
56 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them
more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the
rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.”); see also Edward H. Cooper,
Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1761, 1761
(2004) (describing the purpose of the restyling project as being “to translate present
text into clear language that does not change the meaning”). Professor Cooper
served as the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure during the Restyle Project. See id. at n.*.
Though unstated, there might have been other purposes of the Restyle Project as
well. For example, it appears that the Advisory Committee also sought to correct
obvious errors and oversights, at least to some extent. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56
advisory committee’s note (“Former Rule 56(a) and (b) referred to summaryjudgment motions on or against a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim, or to obtain a
declaratory judgment. The list was incomplete. Rule 56 applies to third-party
claimants, intervenors, claimants in interpleader, and others. Amended Rule 56(a)
and (b) carry forward the present meaning by referring to a party claiming relief and
a party against whom relief is sought.”).
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (describing the limited
purpose of the Restyle Project); see also Cooper, supra note 3, at 1780 (“Deliberate
substantive changes, even slight changes, must be addressed by other means.”).
Again, obvious exceptions were those revisions expressly identified as potentially
resulting in some substantive change. See supra note 2 (discussing this aspect of the
Restyle Project).
5. Actually, the text of Rule 3 (“A civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court.”) was not changed, but the title (or “caption”) was.
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (repealed 2007) (“Commencement of Action”), with FED. R.
CIV. P. 3 (“Commencing an Action”).
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provisions formerly in effect were horribly drafted,6 terminological
inconsistencies abounded,7 and oversights were evident.8 Many of
these problems have been corrected, and, for the most part, the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Advisory Committee”) should be commended. Indeed, unlike
some,9 the author of this Article is willing to concede that, on
balance, the changes were positive.
The Restyle Project was not a complete success, though. In some
instances, the Advisory Committee failed to make desirable changes.10
In other instances, the changes made by the Advisory Committee—
contrary to the stated purposes of the project—likely resulted in
substantive change.11 But rather than engage in a general critique of
this project, this Article will focus on just one aspect: the change
6. See, e.g., Bradley Scott Shannon, Action Is an Action Is an Action Is an Action,
77 WASH. L. REV. 65, 101–02 (2002) (discussing the first paragraph of former Rule
26(c), which consisted of a single sentence of more than 200 words).
7. See, e.g., id. at 100 (discussing places where the former Rules used the words
“case” or “lawsuit” rather than the more appropriate term “action”).
8. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (discussing the obvious
omissions in the applicability of former Rule 56(a), (b)).
9. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
155, 156 (2006) (arguing in opposition to the adoption of the restyled Rules).
10. For example, in many instances, ambiguity remains because the same words
are used to express more than one meaning. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (using
“may” to express both permission and possibility); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(d) (using
“action” to describe both the court’s ruling and the proceeding itself). In other
instances, the Rules continue to use different words to express the same concept.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a), (b) (interchanging “court” with “judge”); FED. R. CIV. P.
50(a)(2)(b) (interchanging “case” with “action”). In still other instances, internal
inconsistencies remain unaddressed. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (“A motion
asserting [defenses (1) through (7)] must be made before pleading if a responsive
pleading is allowed.”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2), (3) (permitting the assertion of
defenses (1), (6), and (7) by motion, post-pleading); compare FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)
(prescribing the personal jurisdictional reach of the district courts), with FED. R. CIV.
P. 82 (“These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district
courts . . . .”). And in some instances, the changes that were made seem incomplete.
For example, former Rule 81(e) defined state “law” as including “the statutes of that
state and the state judicial decisions construing them.” FED. R. CIV. P. 81(e)
(repealed 2007). Rule 81(d)(1) now defines state “law” as including “the state’s
statutes and the state’s judicial decisions.” FED. R. CIV. P. 81(d)(1). But does not
state law, for purposes of the Rules, include more than state statutes and judicial
decisions? If so, why are those other authorities not described? Why is this term not
defined in terms of what it is, rather than what it includes? Why is it defined at all?
All of the above concerns were raised with the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure prior to the conclusion of the Restyle Project. See Letter from Bradley
Scott Shannon, Assistant Professor, Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law, to Peter G. McCabe,
Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (Nov. 30, 2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CV%20Comments%202005/05-CV-009.pdf.
11. The change that is the subject of this Article arguably falls into this category.
See infra Part I.C (arguing that the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 is
substantive); see also Hartnett, supra note 9, at 164 (“[T]he Advisory Committee has
not cleared up all of the ways the proposed restyled rules might change the meaning
of the existing rules.”).
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from “shall” to “should” to describe the standard by which a federal
district court is to decide a proper—i.e., “properly made and
For whereas
supported”12—motion for summary judgment.
previously summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith”13
following the filing of a proper motion therefor, now such a
judgment only “should be rendered.”14 This seemingly innocent
change15 might well result in a radical transformation of federal
summary judgment practice,16 a significant aspect of modern federal
civil litigation.17
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts. In Part I,
the Article will discuss the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56,
starting with a discussion of the prior usage and meaning of “shall” in
the Rules generally and in Rule 56 in particular. The Article will then
discuss the Advisory Committee’s elimination of “shall” from the
Rules and the various terms substituted in its place. In particular, the
Article will discuss the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 and
the Advisory Committee’s justification for that change. Part II will
consider what might be the ultimate issue: the normative efficacy of
utilizing a discretionary summary judgment standard. The Article
will conclude that, as a textual matter and as a matter of Supreme
Court precedent, “shall,” as used in Rule 56, cannot plausibly be
construed to mean “should.” Further, because the change from
“shall” to “should” in Rule 56 was not justified by those authorities
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2). In other words, a “proper” motion for summary
judgment, as that term is used in this Article, is a motion where “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (repealed 2007) (emphasis added).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). In order for readers to fully
appreciate the nature and scope of this change, the full text of former and restyled
Rule 56 is reproduced in Appendices A and B, respectively.
15. The change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 was almost completely
unopposed. In fact, when restyled Rule 56 as proposed by the Advisory Committee
was released for public comment, the author of this Article was the only person who
formally objected. See 2005 Civil Rules Comments Chart, http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/CV%20Rules%202005.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2008) (describing the
comments received on the restyled Rules as proposed).
16. See infra notes 95–104 and accompanying text. This change also could have a
dramatic impact on state court practice, though whether any state adopts this
language remains to be seen. Of course, to the extent the states decline to adopt
Rule 56 as restyled, this change could have a dramatic impact on the federal-state
court balance.
17. Consider that Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), both celebrated Supreme Court summary
judgment decisions, “are by far the top two cases in terms of federal court citations,
each with over 70,000.” Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex:
Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 81, 87 (2006).
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cited by the Advisory Committee, this change should be regarded as
substantive, not stylistic.
More importantly, “should” is an
inappropriate standard for deciding a motion for summary
judgment; a district court should have no discretion to deny a proper
motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 therefore should be
amended to reflect what was and should be a district court’s
obligation in this regard.
I. THE CHANGE FROM “SHALL” TO “SHOULD” IN FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56
A. The Prior Usage and Meaning of the Term “Shall”
in the Rules Generally and in Rule 56
Prior to the Restyle Project, “shall” was a term that “permeate[d]
the rules.”18 What did “shall” mean? The best answer, of course, is
that the meaning of “shall” depended (at least to some extent) on the
particular context in which it was used19 because, as with many words,
“shall” is a word with more than one meaning.20
So let us consider a single (and presumably uncontroversial)
example. Former Rule 4(c)(1), the rule governing service of process,
provided: “A summons shall be served together with a copy of the
complaint.”21 As used in that rule, what was the most likely meaning
of the term “shall”? Surely, the idea was that service of a summons
together with a copy of the complaint was mandatory—i.e., that the
person responsible for serving process was required to serve the
summons and a copy of the complaint more or less simultaneously.22
18. Cooper, supra note 3, at 1766. In fact, according to a Westlaw search
conducted just prior to the effective date of the restyled Rules, “shall” appeared in
the Rules 510 times.
19. See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (invoking the
“fundamental principle of statutory construction (and indeed, of language itself)” to
find “that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be
drawn from the context in which it is used”).
20. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2085–86 (1993)
[hereinafter WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY] (defining “shall” alternatively as meaning “a
command or exhortation,” “what is inevitable,” and “determination”). Even when
confined to law, “shall” can have several meanings. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407
(8th ed. 2004) (defining “shall” alternatively as meaning “[h]as a duty to” or “is
required to,” “[s]hould,” “[m]ay,” “[w]ill,” and “[i]s entitled to”). Of course, this
does not mean that “shall,” at least as it is used in the Rules, can reasonably mean
anything. Moreover, it is one thing to consider how a word can be used; it is quite
another to consider how, in any given context, it is ordinarily used. See Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242–43 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the
distinction between a word’s possible meanings and ordinary meanings).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1) (repealed 2007) (emphasis added).
22. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1407 (explaining that “shall”
imparts “the mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically
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It should come as no surprise, then, that in a similar context, the
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. In Anderson v.
Yungkau,23 the Court was called upon to interpret a former version of
Rule 25(a), which provided: “‘If a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court within 2 years after the death may
order substitution of the proper parties. If substitution is not so
made, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.’”24
Interpreting this rule, the Court held:
In contrast to the discretion of the court to order substitution
within the two-year period is the provision of Rule 25(a) that if
substitution is not made within that time the action “shall be
dismissed” as to the deceased. The word “shall” is ordinarily “the
language of command.” And when the same Rule uses both “may”
and “shall,” the normal inference is that each is used in its usual
sense—the one act being permissive, the other mandatory.25

It is equally unsurprising that the Court has reaffirmed this
interpretation in other contexts several times since.26
Let us now consider Rule 56 and summary judgment. Former Rule
56(c) provided:
uphold”); WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 2085 (explaining that “shall” is
“used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory”); see also
1A NORMAN L. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 25.4 (6th ed. 2002)
(“Unless the context otherwise indicates the use of the word ‘shall’ (except in its
future tense) indicates a mandatory intent.”). This meaning of “shall” also has
normative support. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1407 (explaining
that only this mandatory sense “is acceptable under strict standards of drafting”);
Joseph Kimble, The Many Misuses of Shall, 3 SCRIBES J. LEG. WRITING 61, 64 (1992)
[hereinafter Kimble, The Many Misuses] (“Every single authority on legal drafting . . .
insists that shall must be used . . . to recite an obligation in a contract, or to give a
command in a statute.”). Professor Kimble served as the Style Consultant for the
Restyle Project. Memorandum from Joseph Kimble, Style Consultant, Thomas
Cooley Law School, to All Readers (Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Kimble Memo] in
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED STYLE REVISION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, at x (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Prelim_draft_
proposed_pt1.pdf.
23. 329 U.S. 482 (1947).
24. Id. at 484 (quoting former Rule 25(a)) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 485 (citation omitted).
26. See, e.g., Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001) (describing the
meaning of “shall” as “absolute,” citing Yungkau); Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (describing the use of “the
mandatory ‘shall,’ which normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial
discretion,” again citing Yungkau).
Admittedly, in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005), the Court
rejected the notion that the inclusion of “shall” in a restraining order “made
enforcement of restraining orders [by law enforcement officers] mandatory.” Id. at
760. But the Court based its interpretation on the unique nature of the order at
issue, the relevant statutory scheme, and the “deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement
discretion.” Id. at 761. Notably, the Court failed to mention Yungkau or any of the
other cases cited above.
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The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.27

Similarly, former Rule 56(e) provided:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the
adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the
adverse party.28

As used in former Rule 56, what did “shall” mean? Certainly, if a
motion for summary judgment was “made and supported as provided
in this rule,”29 a district court was permitted to grant the motion, but
was it required to?
Yes; the context in which this term is used strongly suggests a
mandatory result, and nothing in former Rule 56 itself indicates to
the contrary. For if, in this situation, the moving party was “entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law,”30 then was not a district court
required to grant the motion? And why must an adverse party
respond to a proper motion for summary judgment31 if a district
court had the power to deny that motion in any event?
Moreover, though it does not appear that the Supreme Court has
confronted this precise issue, on several occasions the Court has
suggested courts are required to grant a proper summary judgment
motion. For example, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,32 the Court stated that
the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.33
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (repealed 2007) (emphasis added).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (repealed 2007) (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (repealed 2007).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) (repealed 2007). It also might be observed that, as with
the rule at issue in Yungkau, former Rule 56 used both “may” and “shall,” thus
permitting a sound inference that the latter usage was mandatory. See supra text
accompanying note 25 (describing this inference).
32. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
33. Id. at 322; see Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion To
Deny Summary Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 103
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Similarly, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,34 the Court stated that the
standard for summary judgment
mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a
verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one
reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. . . .
. . . In essence, . . . the inquiry under each is the same: whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.35

In sum, considering the text of former Rule 56 and language in
prior Supreme Court opinions, there is little question that “shall,”
when used in connection with a district court’s duty with respect to a
proper motion for summary judgment, meant that the court was
required to grant the motion.
B. The Elimination of “Shall” and the Substitutes Therefor
Despite the clear meaning of “shall” in the contexts discussed
above, the Advisory Committee regarded this term as ambiguous, and
therefore problematic.36 As a result, as part of the Restyle Project, the
Advisory Committee substituted what it regarded to be less
ambiguous terms. Specifically, it “replace[d] ‘shall’ with ‘must,’
‘may,’ or ‘should,’ depending on which one the context and
established interpretation make correct in each rule.”37
(2002) (“The Celotex opinion is surely correct that the ‘plain language’ of Rule 56
mandates that courts enter summary judgment when the movant has demonstrated
that no disputed issues of material fact exist.”).
34. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
35. Id. at 250–52 (emphasis added). One might keep in mind that, strictly
speaking, the Celotex and Liberty Lobby Courts were simply discussing the language of
Rule 56 as then in force, meaning this language probably should not be taken as
making any normative statement about how a motion for summary judgment ought to
be decided in the absence of any express direction. Nonetheless, if the issue is the
meaning of Rule 56 prior to restyling, that meaning seems fairly clear.
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note (“The restyled rules minimize
the use of inherently ambiguous words. For example, the word “shall” can mean
“must,” “may,” or something else, depending on context. The potential for
confusion is exacerbated by the fact that “shall” is no longer generally used in spoken
or clearly written English.”); see also Cooper, supra note 3, at 1766 (“Ambiguity
nowhere presents a more pervasive problem than arises from ‘shall.’”); Kimble, The
Many Misuses, supra note 22, at 61 (“[S]hall is the most misused word in the legal
vocabulary.”).
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note; see also Bryan A. Garner, The
Art of Boiling Down, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 27, 31 (2005) (observing that the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure already “have been
stripped of the chameleon-hued word”). Mr. Garner also had his hand in the
restyling of the Rules. See Kimble Memo, supra note 22 (stating that Garner’s work
was used as a guide for drafting the restyled Rules).
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The term most frequently substituted for “shall” was “must.”38
Consider again Rule 4(c)(1), which formerly provided that “[a]
summons shall be served together with a copy of the complaint.”39 As
restyled, Rule 4(c)(1) now reads: “A summons must be served with a
copy of the complaint.”40 In this context, “must” makes sense, for
though “shall” and “must” do not mean exactly the same thing,41
“must” comes very close (and probably closer than any other single
word) to expressing the idea being conveyed in Rule 4(c)(1)—the
requirement that a summons and a copy of the complaint be served
together.42
In a few places, the Advisory Committee substituted “may,” rather
than “must,” for “shall.”43 For example, former Rule 33(a) provided
that leave to serve more than twenty-five interrogatories on another
party “shall be granted,” though only “to the extent consistent with
the principles of Rule 26(b)(2).”44 Restyled Rule 33(a) simply
provides that such leave “may” be granted.45 Viewed in isolation, it is
difficult to understand how “shall” could be interpreted as meaning
“may.”46 In the context of restyled Rule 33(a), though, the use of
“may” seems fairly unobjectionable, as former Rule 33(a) expressly
provided that the decision whether to permit the service of more
than twenty-five interrogatories was dependent upon the

38. Comparisons between the former and restyled Rules are difficult because in
some places, redundant material was eliminated or condensed, whereas in others,
new provisions were added for greater clarity. But it is estimated that “must” was
substituted for “shall” approximately 340 times.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1) (repealed 2007) (emphasis added).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1) (emphasis added).
41. Ideally, “shall” should be used to connote a duty, whereas “must” is more
directory, and should used to express a condition precedent. See Kimble, The Many
Misuses, supra note 22, at 64–67 (explaining the common misuses of the word “shall”
by lawyers). Thus, by eliminating “shall” in favor of “must,” “we do give up a
potentially useful distinction, or at least we have to make the distinction in other
ways.” Id. at 70.
42. See WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1492 (defining “must” as “is
commanded or requested to”); see also UNIFORM STATUTE AND RULE CONSTRUCTION
ACT § 4(a) (1995) (“‘Shall’ and ‘must’ express a duty, obligation, requirement, or
condition precedent.”); Kimble, The Many Misuses, supra note 22, at 64 (“[I]n legal
usage shall is close in meaning to must.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. It is estimated that “may” was substituted for “shall” approximately twentynine times.
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a) (repealed 2007) (emphasis added); see FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2) (repealed 2007) (listing limitations on discoverable material).
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a).
46. “May” usually expresses either permission or probability. See WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY 1396 (defining “may” as “having permission to” and “be in some degree
likely to” ). Of course, these are not the only meanings of “may,” and certainly “shall”
can be used in ways that coincide with such meanings, but that is not the way that
“shall” ordinarily is used.
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consideration of a number of factors, and thus had always involved
some measure of discretion.
Finally, in a handful of places, the Advisory Committee changed
“shall” to “should.”47 For example, former Rule 1 provided that the
Rules “shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action,”48 but Rule 1 now
provides that the Rules only “should” be so construed and
administered.49 As with “may,” it is somewhat difficult to understand
how “shall” could be thought to mean “should.”50 Even in the
context of Rule 1, it is not clear when the Rules should not be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of an action. Perhaps the notion is that
these goals (“just,” “speedy,” and “inexpensive”) might, at times,
conflict (e.g., that which is “just” might be neither “speedy” nor
“inexpensive”), meaning that Rule 1 (like Rule 33(a)) necessarily
calls for some measure of discretion. To this extent, then, this
particular use of “should” might be regarded as unobjectionable, or
at least tolerable.51
Whether the problems associated with “shall” were as dire as those
perceived by the Advisory Committee is debatable. Given its
pervasiveness, it is difficult to believe the original drafters of the Rules
lacked a firm understanding as to what “shall” meant in the various
contexts in which they used it.52 There is also some question as to
whether the replacement terms selected by the Advisory Committee
for the restyled Rules truly mean the same thing as “shall,” even in
seemingly uncontroversial applications, and any change in

47. It is estimated that “should” was substituted for “shall” approximately
fourteen times.
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (repealed 2007) (emphasis added).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
50. Though “shall” and “should” both impose something of a duty, the latter is
usually considered to impose a weaker obligation. See WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 2104
(providing the example, “you should brush your teeth after each meal”). Certainly,
the use of both “must’ and “should” in the restyled Rules indicates a distinction
between these terms. See also id. at 1599 (explaining the distinction between “must”
and “should”).
51. This does not mean, though, that even this use of “should” is appropriate.
For a discussion of some of the other problems associated with the use of “should,”
see infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
52. Ironically enough, the Supreme Court used “shall” in its order approving the
restyled Rules. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note
2 (ordering “[t]hat the foregoing amendments . . . shall take effect on December 1,
2007, and shall govern in all proceedings thereafter commenced”) (emphasis
added). It is difficult to believe the Supreme Court also did not understand what
“shall” meant.
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terminology is likely to result in some level of disruption.53 At the
same time, “must,” “may,” and “should” are no less clear than “shall.”
Thus, to the extent that the meaning of the restyled Rules is
reasonably consistent with that of the former Rules, the changes
made by the Advisory Committee still may be regarded as positive.
Trouble arises, though, when the new term selected by the Advisory
Committee results in a discernable—even substantive—change in
meaning.
Consider, again, Rule 56: as a textual matter, and as suggested by
the Supreme Court, the granting of a proper motion for summary
judgment was mandatory under the former Rule 56. But did the
Advisory Committee change “shall” to “must” in Rule 56? No.
Instead, it changed “shall” to “should.”54 So now, even when a
motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, it
need not be granted. Such a motion may be granted—indeed, it
should be granted—but it does not have to be granted. And this seems
clearly wrong—or at least it seems to go beyond mere restyling.
C. The Justification for the Change from “Shall” to “Should” in Rule 56
Given the dubious nature of the change from “shall” to “should” in
Rule 56, one might be tempted to ask how (or why) the Advisory
Committee arrived at the decision to make such a change. Part of
the answer might lie in the manner in which the Advisory Committee
viewed its role with respect to the Restyle Project. Though one might
have expected it to opt for more literal translations there are
indications that the Advisory Committee saw its role as being to
conform the Rules to established practice.55
53. See Shannon, supra note 6, at 81 (discussing the problems potentially
associated with the exchange of seemingly synonymous words).
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), (e)(2). Actually, in several instances, “shall” was
changed to “must” even within Rule 56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (describing the time
by which a motion for summary judgment is to be served); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d)(1)
(describing the manner in which partial summary judgments are to be regarded at
trial); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(1) (describing the requirements for supporting or
opposing affidavits); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(g) (describing the consequences for
submitting affidavits in bad faith). It is at least somewhat difficult to understand how
the meaning of “shall” could shift as it is used within this rule.
55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note (explaining that the choice of
the term to replace “shall” was based, in part, on “established interpretation”).
Certainly, the notion that established practice might have been at work in the
restyling of Rule 56 is reflected in the note accompanying restyled Rule 56, which
explains:
Former Rule 56(c), (d), and (e) stated circumstances in which summary
judgment “shall be rendered,” the court “shall if practicable” ascertain facts
existing without substantial controversy, and “if appropriate, shall” enter
summary judgment. In each place “shall” is changed to “should.” It is
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Whether importing established practice is an appropriate approach
to restyling the Rules seems debatable. Should the courts, in effect,
be permitted to amend the Rules (which are, after all, rules and not
just guidelines or suggestions56) in this fashion? Arguably not.
Federal courts are duty-bound to abide by the Rules, which are
regarded as having essentially the same binding force as a federal
statute.57 It, therefore, seems that any changes that might be
considered substantive, vis-à-vis actual rule text, might be more
appropriately accomplished through the formal (and traditional)
amendment process.58
Even assuming that established practice should be incorporated
into the Rules, there is still the pronounced question whether the
change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 truly reflected established
practice. Did it? Was it in fact “established”59 that a district court had
discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment? Let us
examine the authorities cited by the Advisory Committee more
closely.

established that although there is no discretion to enter summary judgment
when there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, there is discretion to
deny summary judgment when it appears that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256–257 (1948).
Many lower court decisions are gathered in 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3d, § 2728. “Should” in amended
Rule 56(c) recognizes that courts will seldom exercise discretion to deny
summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Similarly sparing exercise of this discretion is appropriate under Rule
56(e)(2). Rule 56(d)(1), on the other hand, reflects the more open-ended
discretion to decide whether it is practicable to determine what material
facts are not genuinely at issue.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note. Professor Cooper further explains:
There is a real risk that meaning will be changed in choosing whether to
substitute “must” . . . for “shall.” This risk may occur even when it is clear
that “shall” was originally intended to mean “must.” Actual practice may
have added some measure of discretion. The dilution of the original
command may reflect that practice has shown a better way: discretion is
more useful, even more important, than the drafters understood.
Cooper, supra note 3, at 1777–78.
56. See Shannon, supra note 6, at 86 n.83 (“One also might consider the very
choice of the word rules, as opposed to guidelines, suggestions, and other, similar
terms.”).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000) (“All laws in conflict with [the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure] shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.”); Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 668 (1996) (holding that the
Rules supersede conflicting statutory authority).
58. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 (2000). Certainly, the number of amendments made
to the Rules in recent years, as well as the frequency in which the Rules have been
amended, show that the Advisory Committee knows how to initiate the formal
amendment process and that it is not afraid to do so.
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note.
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The Advisory Committee cites Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co.60 as
support for the proposition that a district court properly may deny a
motion for summary judgment even in the absence of a genuine issue
Kennedy involved questions regarding the
of material fact.61
application of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to employees of contractors hired by the War Department.62 The
defendant contractor filed a motion for summary judgment, which
was granted by the district court and affirmed by the court of
appeals.63 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court began by
observing that this case involved “an extremely important question,
probably affecting all cost-plus-fixed-fee war contractors and many of
their employees immediately, and ultimately affecting by a vast sum
the cost of fighting the war.”64 The Court then stated:
We do not hold that in the form the controversy took in the
District Court that tribunal lacked power or justification for
applying the summary judgment procedure.
But summary
procedures, however salutary where issues are clear-cut and simple,
present a treacherous record for deciding issues of far-flung
import, on which this Court should draw inferences with caution
from complicated courses of legislation, contracting and practice.
We consider it the part of good judicial administration to
withhold decision of the ultimate questions involved in this case
until this or another record shall present a more solid basis of
findings based on litigation or on a comprehensive statement of
agreed facts. While we might be able, on the present record, to
reach a conclusion that would decide the case, it might well be
found later to be lacking in the thoroughness that should precede
judgment of this importance and which it is the purpose of the
judicial process to provide.65

Thus, “[w]ithout intimating any conclusion on the merits,” the Court
vacated—not reversed—the judgments below and remanded the case
to the district court “for reconsideration and amplification of the
record in the light of this opinion and of present contentions.”66
The Kennedy Court thus held only that it considered it unwise to
decide issues of great importance based on a scant district court

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

334 U.S. 249 (1948).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note.
See 334 U.S. at 251.
See id. at 253.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 256–57 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 257.
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record.67 It did not hold that a district court has the discretion to
deny a motion for summary judgment in the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. The Kennedy Court also gave no indication that
it intended to essentially overrule its then very recent decision in
Yungkau regarding the usual meaning of “shall” in the Rules.68
Though not mentioned by the Advisory Committee, some might
observe that the Court has in fact stated that a district court may deny
a motion for summary judgment when it has “reason to believe that
the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.”69 Whether this
statement should be taken as an endorsement of discretionary
summary judgment is far from clear. But even if it is, it should also
be observed that the only authority cited in support of this
proposition was Kennedy,70 and we now know that the Kennedy Court
made no such holding.71 Moreover, as it appeared in Liberty Lobby,
this statement was clearly dicta, for it had nothing to do with the
holding in that case.72 Finally, this statement seems contrary to other
language in that opinion that suggests an absence of discretion in this
context.73
The Advisory Committee also stated that many lower courts have
held that a district court has the discretion to deny a valid motion for
67. In Supreme Court jurisprudence, such a tack is hardly unique. See, e.g.,
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984)
(“We decline to consider adoption of a doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity—a
potentially far-reaching modification of existing law—in the absence of a more
complete record.”).
68. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the Kennedy Court did
state in a footnote that
Rule 56 provides that the trial court may award summary judgment after
motion, notice and hearing, provided the pleadings, depositions, admissions
and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
334 U.S. at 252 n.4 (emphasis added). Though some might interpret this footnote as
authority for the proposition that a grant of summary judgment is discretionary, the
better interpretation is that the Court was simply acknowledging what a trial court is
permitted to do in this context. After all, the Court did not say that summary judgment
may be denied in this context, and certainly this language is as consistent with a
mandatory reading of Rule 56 as it is with a discretionary reading. More significantly,
in a later footnote, the Court stated: “Rule 56 requires that summary judgment shall
be rendered if ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact * * *.’ See note 4.”
Id. at 257 n.7 (emphasis added). In light of this later footnote, it would be difficult
to conclude that the Court regarded the district court’s obligation here as anything
other than mandatory.
69. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
70. See id. at 255.
71. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s holding
in Kennedy).
72. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV.
953, 1065 (2005) (“If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”).
73. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing other aspects of the
Liberty Lobby decision).
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summary judgment.74 It is true that some decisions to this effect can
be found in the treatise cited by the Advisory Committee.75 But what
the Advisory Committee failed to mention is that other lower federal
courts have held that a district court has no such discretion.76 Thus,
even among the lower federal courts, the results here are mixed—
presumably not the sort of authority on which to make a change that
is “intended to be stylistic only.”77 That some lower courts have
reached a contrary conclusion also does not support the notion that
this issue was settled by the Supreme Court in Kennedy.78
In sum, prior to the Restyle Project, it was not at all established that
a district court had discretion to deny a proper motion for summary
judgment. Thus, even if one regards it appropriate to make “stylistic”
amendments based on established practice, there is substantial doubt
that the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 in fact reflected
established practice.
Before leaving this subpart, one might be further tempted to ask:
Why, if it had not previously been established that a district court had
discretion to deny a proper summary judgment motion, the Advisory
Committee nonetheless made this change? And why did it make this
change in this manner? Unless one believes that the Advisory
Committee believed what it wrote with respect to the law of summary
judgment, the answers to these questions are unclear.79 One can
speculate that the answer to the first question might be that this was a
change the Advisory Committee simply desired; it might have
thought district courts should have more decisional latitude, either

74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note.
75. See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2728 (3d ed. 1998) (“Judicial Discretion in Deciding a Rule 56 Motion”).
76. See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 104 (“Federal courts of appeals
are currently split over whether judges must grant summary judgment if it is
technically appropriate.”).
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note. Moreover, the treatise cited
by the Advisory Committee also states that “[i]n some situations, the court may have
an obligation to grant summary judgment.” 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 524
(emphasis added). It is somewhat difficult to understand how a district court could
have an obligation to grant a proper motion for summary judgment in some
situations but not in all.
78. Indeed, though Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Gardner are quite sympathetic
to the notion of discretionary summary judgment, see infra notes 138–148 and
accompanying text, even they admit “the Kennedy decision itself is somewhat
contradictory.” Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 102.
79. To be clear, the author of this Article is not suggesting that the members of
the Advisory Committee engaged in some form of bad faith, or that the Advisory
Committee’s note to restyled Rule 56 is a sham. However, given the weakness of the
authorities cited by the Advisory Committee, one can hardly help but suspect that
there was something else motivating this change.
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generally or as to summary judgment in particular.80 As for the
second question, perhaps the Committee thought this change might
be accomplished more easily (and more quickly) if regarded as
restyling, rather than substantive.81 Regardless, these questions, as
interesting as they might be, are now moot, for even if not established
previously, it is now firmly established that we live in a world of
discretionary summary judgment.
II. SHOULD “SHOULD” BE THE STANDARD?
Though the change from “shall” to “should” in Rule 56 was not
justified by the text of that rule or by Supreme Court precedent, the
normative question remains unanswered: Irrespective of how we got
here, should “should” be the standard with respect to summary
judgment?
Before answering this question, it might be observed that “should”
is a rather curious standard for use in a rule.82 To see why this is so,
let us consider a different example. Suppose the following law has
80. As Professor Cooper once remarked:
Discretion is a useful rulemaking technique when it is difficult—as it almost
always is—to foresee even the most important problems and to determine
their wise resolution. Reliance on discretion is vindicated only when district
judges and magistrate judges use it wisely most of the time and in most cases.
The ongoing revisions of the Civil Rules time and again reflect an implicit
judgment that confidence is well placed in the discretionary exercise of
power by federal trial judges. In a wonderful way, there may be an
interdependence at work—the very fact that there is discretionary authority
to guide litigation to a wise resolution may enable us to attract to the bench
judges who will use the authority wisely. It is not clear beyond dispute, but
let us assume that the open-textured reliance on trial-judge discretion is
working well.
Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794, 1795
(2002).
81. It also might be observed that although some restyling amendments were
deemed substantive, see discussion supra note 2, the changes made to Rule 56 were
not among them. Regardless of whether the changes made to Rule 56 should have
been deemed substantive, it is probably safe to presume that their inclusion in that
group would have drawn more attention to those changes.
82. This does not mean that the use of the word “should” is always illegitimate in
this context. In fact, even prior to the Restyle Project, it appears that the term
“should” was used in the Rules approximately thirty-five times, and many of those
uses were uncontroversial. For example, former Rule 56(f) provided:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that
the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order
as is just.
As used in this subdivision, “should” simply meant “if,” and in fact, restyled Rule
56(f) now uses the latter. But this is far different usage from that currently found in
Rule 56 regarding the standard to be applied to a decision on a motion for summary
judgment.
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been proposed to a state legislature: “All motor vehicles should be
driven at or below the posted speed limit.”83 Should a rational
legislator vote in favor of such a law? Is it enough that the legislator
believes driving at or below posted speed limits is a good idea? Or
should the legislator also consider how a rational driver is supposed
to apply this standard? What would be a sufficient reason for
exceeding the posted speed limit? Superior driving ability? Greater
fuel economy? Would it be enough if the driver were to say, “Well,
maybe I should drive the posted speed limit, but I just feel like driving
a little faster today”? And if a law enforcement officer were to
disagree with the decision made by the driver and issue a citation, on
what basis would a court determine who was right? The general
unworkability of such a standard—not to mention the potential for
injustice—seems manifest.84
Now consider the use of “should” in Rule 56. Why should summary
judgment be discretionary? On what basis may a properly made and
supported motion for summary judgment properly be denied?85 Rule

83. Such a statute is not purely hypothetical. For example, Montana Code § 61-8303(1) once provided: “‘A person operating . . . a vehicle . . . on a public highway . . .
shall drive . . . in a careful and prudent manner and at a rate of speed no greater than is
reasonable and proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation . . . .’” State v.
Stanko, 974 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Mont. 1998) (emphasis added by the court).
84. Cf. Stanko, 974 P.2d at 1138 (holding former Montana Code § 61-8-303(1)
unconstitutionally vague). Even aside from unconstitutionality, practical problems
with the Montana’s statute abounded. As two legal scholars concluded shortly after
the law’s enactment:
Enforcement is perhaps the biggest problem with the [Montana statute].
Although ticket revenues have increased, roadside confrontations, accident
investigations and court appearances also have increased, depleting the
already scant resources of the Highway Patrol and judiciary. Furthermore,
the subjective standard has proven an onerous task to administer. Arbitrary
and inconsistent enforcement by the police, prosecutors, and judges
impedes citizens’ compliance and the law’s effectiveness.
Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155, 191
(1999). Montana Code § 61-8-303 has since been amended in favor of a definite
speed limit. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-303 (2007).
85. In other words (to reframe the issue), should the “test” used in deciding a
motion for summary judgment appear more like a rule, or more like a standard?
Much, of course, has been written on the rule-standard dichotomy. See Frederick
Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 803, 803 n.1 (2005) (collecting authorities on this issue). As a result of this
scholarship, it appears that the issues here are not whether one is superior to the
other, or even whether the choice of one over the other sufficiently constrains those
charged with its enforcement, for it now seems established that both have their place
in the legal firmament and that rules tend to become “standardized” over time, and
vice versa. Rather, the issue is which—a rule or a standard—is most likely to produce
the “best” overall results in any given context, understanding that there will likely be
pros and cons associated with either choice. Thus, the burden should be on those
who favor discretionary summary judgment (and it seems fair to place the burden on
that group, given the historically contrary presumption) to prove that a more
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56(f) has long provided that the resolution of a motion for summary
judgment may be postponed if the party opposing the motion is then
unable to present facts in support of its position.86 Reasonable
requests for postponing the resolution of a motion for summary
judgment not covered by Rule 56(f) presumably may be
accommodated by continuing the hearing on that motion. Is there
any legitimate reason for denying (even temporarily) a proper
motion for summary judgment that is not covered by these
procedures? An affirmative answer is difficult to imagine.87
A second problem with restyled Rule 56 relates to the rather openended nature of the standard provided. Though Rule 56 now
expressly permits a district court to deny a proper motion for
summary judgment, it provides no guidance as to what might
constitute a legally sufficient reason for doing so. Presumably, such a
motion could not properly be denied for any reason. After all, the
rule specifies that the motion “should” be granted, not simply that it
“may” be granted, and even the latter would be construed as
constraining the district courts to some extent.88 The Advisory

standard-like approach to summary judgment is superior to a more rule-like
approach.
86. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 599 n.20 (1998) (“The judge does . . .
have discretion to postpone ruling on a defendant’s summary judgment motion if
the plaintiff needs additional discovery to explore ‘facts essential to justify the party’s
opposition.’ Rule 56(f).”). Though Rule 56(f) also states that the motion may be
denied in this situation, this language—which might be new, see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f)
(repealed 2007) (providing only that the district court “may refuse the application
for judgment”)—should not be interpreted as providing the opposing party a free
pass to a trial, as such a ruling would vitiate the entire procedure. See also infra note
132 and accompanying text.
87. At least to the author of this Article. Others have attempted to formulate
arguments along that line, though. For a discussion of these arguments (and some
possible responses thereto), see infra notes 107–155 and accompanying text.
88. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977) (defining
“discretion” as “making decisions subject to standards set by a particular authority”);
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 144 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) (defining “discretion” as “the power to choose between two or more
courses of action each of which is thought of as permissible”). In other words, such
exercises of discretion—which might be referred to as exercises of “legal”
discretion—should be distinguished from pure or “personal” discretion. See Robert
G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961,
2022 n.10 (2007) (“When someone has complete freedom to choose based purely on
personal preference without any constraint, we do not usually refer to this as an
exercise of ‘discretion’ . . . .”). Still, a decision-maker in this context would be
afforded considerable latitude. See id. at 1965.
Thus, the exercise of “legal” discretion also should be distinguished from what
some, including Justice Scalia, see supra note 1 and accompanying quote, might
simply refer to as the exercise of judgment. Cf. DWORKIN, supra, at 31 (“Sometimes
we use ‘discretion’ in a weak sense, simply to say that for some reason the standards
an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of
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Committee’s note accompanying Rule 56 further suggests that the
exercise of this discretion should be “sparing.”89 Regrettably, the
word “sparing” failed to find its way into the text of Rule 56, and the
rule otherwise provides no express basis for cabining the discretion
conferred. And as one prominent legal scholar has cautioned that
“[d]iscretion can be quite dangerous . . . when it is unbounded.”90
The most obvious concern with a discretionary standard for
summary judgment is that it “increases the opportunity for judges to
base their decisions on personal biases or other impermissible
reasons rather than on the merits of the motion.”91 Even exercises of
discretion in the name of case management could “diminish certainty
and increase litigation costs.”92 Moreover, “even if such management
resulted in the promotion of substantive justice, it [might] do so in a
haphazard way, because the ultimate outcome would depend upon

judgment.”). For more on the nature of judicial discretion generally, see Nathan
Isaacs, The Limits of Judicial Discretion, 32 YALE L.J. 339 (1923).
89. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note; cf. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 75, at 526–27 (“Of course, too frequent exercise of discretion to deny summary
judgment by the courts could vitiate the utility of the procedure. . . . Thus, the
court’s discretion to deny summary judgment when it otherwise appears that the
movant has satisfied the Rule 56 burden should be exercised sparingly.”). Professor
Friedenthal and Mr. Gardner elaborate:
Concerns of inappropriate judicial activism in denying summary
judgment may be alleviated by recognition of the actual practice of federal
courts that have allowed denials of technically appropriate motions. . . . [I]t
appears that only in a handful of cases have trial judges actually denied
summary judgment when it was otherwise appropriate. It is doubtful that
specifically providing for judicial discretion in Rule 56 would substantially
increase the number of denials. Fears that judges will refuse summary
judgment in deserving cases are ameliorated by the structural incentives
against denying such a motion unless good reason exists. Judges have an
increasingly large docket to manage. By denying summary judgment in a
particular case, a judge would be forced to oversee a case that she could have
otherwise thrown out, thereby contributing to her overburdened docket.
Thus, a judge would be unlikely to deny an otherwise appropriate summary
judgment motion unless she has a significant reason for doing so.
Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 119–20. Of course, if the discretion to deny
a proper motion for summary judgment should be exercised only rarely, one might
reasonably ask whether a discretionary standard is worth the bother.
90. David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1995 (1989); see Bone, supra note 88, at 1964
(arguing that “rulemakers should be much more skeptical of delegating discretion to
trial judges and should seriously consider adopting rules that limit or channel
discretion more aggressively”). Indeed, even some proponents of discretionary
summary judgment have called for something a little less open-ended. See, e.g.,
Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 95 (“[T]his discretion should not be
unbridled; judges should be given guidelines for deciding when a denial of summary
judgment is appropriate.”).
91. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 117.
92. Id.
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the individual judge’s skill as a case manager rather than the judicial
application of substantive rules of law.”93
The absence of any express guidance as to how to apply restyled
Rule 56 also leads to another problem: because a district court now
has the discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment,
an appellate court presumably may overturn such a decision only for
an abuse of discretion.94 But just as the reasons why a proper motion
for summary judgment properly may be denied are difficult to
discern, so are the bases for determining whether those reasons are
legally insufficient. As a result, appellate review of district court
rulings on motions for summary judgment has now been made much
more complicated,95 and the results in such cases have been made
much harder to predict.96
But the most significant problem with discretionary summary
judgment might be its effect on the modern federal civil procedure
scheme. For the discretion at issue here does not relate to some non93. Id. at 118.
94. See id. at 93. By contrast, it was well established that the standard of review of
a decision rendered pursuant to former Rule 56 was de novo. See 11 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.41[3][a], at 56-339 to -341 (3d ed.
2008) (“The appellate court’s review of the appropriateness of a grant or denial of
summary judgment is de novo, using the same standard employed by the district
court in its determination as to whether or not summary judgment was
appropriate.”) (footnote omitted). Of course, given that the standard of review was
de novo, one might (again) wonder how former Rule 56 could be construed as
discretionary.
95. As Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Gardner explain:
If such a denial were to fall within one of the rare exceptions to the final
judgment requirement, the nature of the review by the court of appeals
would itself depend on the question of whether the denial is within the trial
court’s discretion. If the denial were within the trial court’s discretion, then,
in a case in which the denial was based on the trial court’s discretion, the
standard of review would be whether the trial court has abused that
discretion. . . . Moreover, if discretion can play a role in the denial of a
motion for summary judgment, that fact could impact an appeal even when
a trial court has granted the motion. In an extremely rare case, the appellate
court could conceivably hold that a trial court abused its discretion by not
denying the motion.
Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 93. Thus, at the district court level, the
resolution of a motion for summary judgment has now become a two-step process:
1) may the motion be granted, and 2) should it be granted. At the appellate court
level, a similar two-step process will be employed. Additional briefing along these
lines can be expected.
96. The appellate courts also are going to be hampered by the fact that there is
currently no rule requiring the district courts to justify the denial of a motion for
summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(3) (“The court is not required to state
findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule [56] . . . .”). An
amendment to Rule 56 has been proposed that would solve this problem, at least to
some extent. See proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court should state on the
record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.”). Regrettably, the proposed
rule’s use of the term “should” apparently renders the obligation to provide reasons
no greater than the obligation to grant the motion in the first instance.
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dispositive matter, such as the discretion to change the number of
interrogatories a party may propound.97 Rather, this discretion relates
to a dispositive matter—specifically, the ability to deny a judgment, on
the merits, in favor of a party that is otherwise “entitled”98 to it. This
is a remarkable development. As one legal scholar explains:
To be sure, district judges necessarily exercise wide latitude on
many issues that arise in the course of the pretrial process, if for no
reason other than those issues require careful consideration of the
unique aspects of a particular case. . . . But we have never ceded to
such an individualized judging model basic policy choices that are
manifested in our procedural system.99

Equally remarkable is the effect this approach to summary judgment
might have on modern federal court practice. As explained by the
Court in Celotex:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50 years
authorized motions for summary judgment upon proper showings
of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact. Summary
judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal
Rules as a whole, which are designed “to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action.” Before the shift to
“notice pleading” accomplished by the Federal Rules, motions to
dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the principal tools
by which factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated
and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted
consumption of public and private resources. But with the advent
97. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46 (describing the change from “shall”
to “may” in Rule 33). This is not to say that a district court’s exercise of discretion
with respect to such matters cannot have a profound impact on the course of the
litigation; sometimes it can. But it is a difference in kind, if not also in degree, from
the discretion to deny a proper motion for summary judgment.
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
99. Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1357 (2005). Indeed, aside from those
instances in which a district court is empowered to dispose of an action in the face of
egregious conduct by one of the parties, see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b) (“Failure to
Make a Disclosure or Cooperate in Discovery”), this development might be
unprecedented. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”) (emphasis
added); FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(1) (“If the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain . . . the
clerk . . . must enter judgment for that amount and costs against a defendant who has
been defaulted for not appearing . . . .”) (emphasis added). Even a judgment as a
matter of law, a procedure that is thought to include some measure of discretion,
ultimately must be granted if appropriate. See infra notes 150–152 and accompanying
text. Admittedly, an action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction possibly
may be recommenced in state court, see Shannon, supra note 6, at 131–33, and
parties may be granted relief from any judgment under certain circumstances, see
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). But these facts typically do not (and should not) have any
bearing on the decision whether to dispose of the action in the first instance.
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of “notice pleading,” the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this
function any more, and its place has been taken by the motion for
summary judgment. Rule 56 must be construed with due regard
not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that
are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried
to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims
and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule,
prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.100

Thus, “[a]llowing judges discretion to deny summary judgment
when it would technically be appropriate does not come without a
price.”101 Most obviously, such a decision would “burden the courts’
already overcrowded dockets,” because the “[p]arties will be required
to continue with a case that otherwise would have ended or have
And, at the pleading stage, the
been limited in scope.”102
institutionalization of discretionary summary judgment seems likely
to result in the application of additional pressure on the district

100. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (citations omitted); see
Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2067, 2090 (1989) (“The 1938 rulemakers placed primary reliance on Rule 56
providing for summary judgment as the means to extinguish unfounded allegations,
claims, and defenses.”); Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 116–17 (observing
that “the very existence of summary judgment may serve to lessen the filing of
coercive and harassing litigation”).
101. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 120.
102. Id.; see Redish, supra note 99, at 1339–41 (discussing the many problems
associated with “unnecessary trials” caused by the improper application of the
summary judgment procedure). This also supplies the response to those who might
argue that the denial of a proper motion for summary judgment results in little harm
to the moving party. For even if the denial was wrongful, the moving party is unlikely
to be fully vindicated. As Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Gardner explain:
[A] denial of summary judgment is virtually unappealable. Such a decision
is interlocutory in nature and, in the federal system, with rare exceptions,
only a final judgment can be appealed. Once a case has proceeded to trial
and final decision, the preliminary ruling denying summary judgment is
unlikely to be given serious consideration on appeal.
Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 92–93 (footnotes omitted). Conceivably,
some parties with meritorious summary judgment motions might nonetheless decide
to forego this procedure entirely, for if the court is likely to deny the motion in any
event, the cost might not be worth the risk.
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courts to scrutinize the parties’ claims ab initio103—precisely the sort
of practice the Rules have sought to avoid.104
In the face of these concerns, one might wonder how discretionary
summary judgment can be justified. Perhaps the most prominent
proponents of this view are, again, the authors of the treatise cited by
the Advisory Committee.105 The treatise authors begin their defense
of discretionary summary judgment by observing that Rule 56(c)
“establishes the standard for granting summary judgment by
providing that a court may enter judgment only when it appears that
‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”106 The authors
explain—and on this point they surely are correct—that the “district
court has no discretion to enlarge its power to grant summary
judgment beyond the limits prescribed by the rule,” meaning “[i]t
may grant a Rule 56 motion only when the test set forth therein has
been met and must deny the motion as long as a material issue
remains for trial.”107
“On the other hand,” the authors continue,
in most situations in which the moving party seems to have
discharged his burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of
fact exists, the court has discretion to deny a Rule 56 motion. This
is appropriate since even though the summary-judgment standard
appears to have been met, the court should have the freedom to
allow the case to continue when it has any doubt as to the wisdom
of terminating the action prior to a full trial.108

So when, precisely, would such an exercise of discretion be
appropriate? According to the treatise authors,

103. See Carrington, supra note 100, at 2106 (observing that the recent revival of
Rule 12 practice “may reflect dissatisfaction with summary judgment’s ineffectiveness
as a tool for dealing with unfounded contentions”). Indeed, some have read the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), as a
partial response to the district courts’ collective failure to apply the summary
judgment procedure as originally intended. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—
Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 307 (2007) (“Justice Souter argued that a
rigorous pleading standard was needed to curb the abuse of discovery, since neither
pretrial management nor summary judgment had proven particularly effective.”).
104. See Redish, supra note 99, at 1339 (“Especially in light of the federal courts’
longstanding commitment to a notice pleading system, under which pleading
motions are able to perform only an extremely limited role as a gatekeeper against
unjustified lawsuits, summary judgment stands as the only viable postpleading
protector against unnecessary trials.”).
105. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (citing 10A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 75). See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
106. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 517 (quoting Rule 56(c)).
107. Id. at 517–18.
108. Id. at 525–26.
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federal courts [may] exercise their discretion to deny summary
judgment when the non-moving party has failed to offer any
counter-affidavits or to provide any explanation under Rule 56(f)
as to why opposing affidavits are unavailable. Although in theory
summary judgment normally should be granted in these situations,
if the opposing party is suffering from some handicap that prevents
him from satisfying Rule 56(e) or Rule 56(f), such as if the
opposing party is a prisoner unrepresented by counsel, a court
should be hesitant to grant summary judgment.109

Certainly, it would not be unreasonable for a district court to make
some minimal inquiry as to why the nonmoving party failed to
present anything in response to a proper motion for summary
judgment before deciding that motion. But why should a failure to
respond be a ground for denying the motion? Even if the court is
somehow able to determine that the non-moving party is suffering
from some “handicap,” what sort of “handicap” would be sufficient?
And how is a court to know whether this is the reason for the failure
to respond, as opposed to there simply being no factual basis for
opposing the motion? Is a court to presume that contrary evidence
nonetheless exists? And if so, that the non-responsive party will be
able to properly present it at trial? The answers—or lack of satisfying
answers—to these and related imponderables compel the conclusion
that there is nothing unjust about granting a motion for summary
judgment when the non-moving party, after having received
reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, does
nothing.110 If necessary and appropriate, relief from such a judgment
may be sought.111 But prior to the entry of a judgment, a district
court must presume that the lack of any response whatsoever is due
to the lack of any legitimate basis for opposing the motion, and not
due to some other reason.
The treatise authors also argue that a court “should” consider the
“good faith” of a non-moving party that fails to oppose a motion for
summary judgment on what some might view as technicalities.112
Examples provided include if opposing evidence offered “is defective
in form but is sufficient to apprise the court that there is important
and relevant information that could be proffered to defeat the

109. Id. at 527 (footnotes omitted).
110. Indeed, Rule 56 seems to require this result. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970) (“If respondent had met its initial burden . . . , Rule 56(e)
would then have required petitioner to have done more than simply rely on the
contrary allegation in her complaint.”); see also supra note 33.
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
112. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 528–29.
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motion,” or if the opposing party “has complied with Rule 56(f),” in
which case “the court has discretion to decide whether the reasons
offered for the failure to come forward with countering evidence are
sufficient to preclude summary judgment.”113
Undoubtedly, when the requirements of Rule 56(f) have been met,
the opposing party may—perhaps even should—be given more time
to present its evidence. Indeed, for the poorly represented, Rule
56(f) is probably a vastly under-utilized procedure. Moreover, at least
as to some litigants, a district court probably should provide some
guidance as to how to meet “technical” requirements, such as how to
present evidence in a proper form.114 Regardless, such assistance
should not amount to a free pass to trial. There must be a day of
reckoning, and if, after a reasonable amount of time, the opposing
party still is unable to present contrary evidence in proper form, a
proper motion for summary judgment must be granted.115 There is,
again, no reason for believing that the result at trial will be better.116
The authors of the treatise cited by the Advisory Committee next
argue that “[j]udicial discretion also comes into play in evaluating the
material that has been made available to the court.”117 For example,
“although the general rule is that difficult legal issues do not
preclude summary judgment, . . . difficult or complicated legal issues
should not be adjudicated upon an inadequate record.”118 By
113. Id. at 529.
114. Cf. Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (“A document filed pro se
is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
(citations omitted)) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
115. See supra note 86 (arguing the same point).
116. Prior to the Restyle Project, some refuge from “technical” requirements
might have been sought in Rule 1, which used to provide that the Rules “shall be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (repealed 2007). Regrettably, “shall”
was changed to “should” here also, see FED. R. CIV. P. 1, apparently relieving the
district courts of any firm obligation along these lines. A second problem with the
application of Rule 1 is that the supposed “justness” of a denial of a proper motion
for summary judgment must be balanced against the effect of such a decision on the
speed and cost of the eventual determination of the action. That is going to be a
difficult burden to meet. See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text (discussing
the impact of restyled Rule 56 on docket load and speed).
117. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 529.
118. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 529; accord Friedenthal & Gardner, supra
note 33, at 121 (arguing that discretionary summary judgment would enable judges
to “forego investing scarce time and resources into cases that are particularly
complicated or complex, or intertwined with issues not appropriate for summary
judgment”). Professor Friedenthal and Mr. Gardner go so far as to propose the
following cost-benefit balancing test:
In deciding whether to deny summary judgment, judges should conduct a
balancing test, taking into account the interests of both the plaintiff and the
defendant relative to the efficiency concerns of the federal judiciary. If the
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exercising its discretion to deny the motion in such a situation, a
district court would permit development of a fuller record and would
save time if disposition of the motion would require the same time
and effort as a plenary trial.119
It is difficult to dispute the notion that “difficult or complicated
legal issues”—or any legal issues, for that matter—“should not be
adjudicated upon an inadequate record.”120 The sad reality, though,
is that the record—even at trial—is never perfect, and that cases are
probably decided on “inadequate” records daily.121 But this is all
beside the point; at summary judgment, either the motion is
“properly made and supported”122 or it is not, and if it is, that motion
is to be granted unless the opposing party can properly “set out
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.”123 Nothing in Rule 56
expressly permits a court to await a “fuller factual foundation,”124 nor
should it.125
Regarding the cost-benefit argument—i.e., the notion that a
motion for summary judgment may be denied whenever a court
determines that deciding the motion would take more time than
burden on the court in deciding summary judgment would be substantially
greater than the adverse effect of a denial on the movant, then a denial may
be appropriate, without determining the existence of a factual dispute. In
evaluating the costs and benefits of denying summary judgment, courts
should consider such factors as whether the claim involves motive, state of
mind, or credibility, whether the matter is particularly complex, and whether
issues ripe for summary judgment are intertwined with issues not proper for
summary adjudication.
Id. at 95.
119. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 529-30.
120. Id. at 529. Indeed, this was essentially the holding of the Supreme Court in
Kennedy. See supra notes 60–68 and accompanying text (analyzing Kennedy v. Silas
Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948)).
121. At least this is true at the district court and court of appeals levels. To the
extent the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is discretionary, see, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 10
(“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.”), it
might have the luxury of deciding only cases having “adequate” records. Again, that
seems to be what the Court was saying in Kennedy. See supra notes 59–68. The lower
federal courts (and particularly the district courts), however, have little choice but to
“decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction,” Herbert
Weschsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965), no
matter how poorly that issue is presented.
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2).
123. Id.
124. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 530.
125. As for the “intertwined issues” argument (see supra note 118), is this not an
appropriate use of partial summary judgment? See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d)(1) (“If
summary judgment is not rendered on the whole action, the court should, to the
extent practicable, determine what material facts are not genuinely at issue . . . . The
facts so specified must be treated as established in the action.”). Alas, following the
“restyling” of Rule 56(d), a district court only “should” perform this exercise—and
even then, only if “practicable”—meaning partial summary judgments also might be
harder to come by.
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trying the case—this might make sense, if Rule 56 expressly so
provided. It does not. The sad reality again is that many motions
(summary judgment and otherwise) take more time to decide than
they are “worth,” and yet the Rules provide no express exception of
this nature. It also seems doubtful this is a route the federal courts
ought to take, as there are doubtless better ways of dealing with
motions that are not “worth” the cost.126 Moreover, even were Rule
56 construed to include such a cost-benefit exception, one should
consider the difficulty of comparing the “burden on the court” with
the “adverse effect of a denial on the movant.”127 For example, how
does a court know how long it will take to decide a motion for
summary judgment until it actually decides it? Or how long it would
take to try a case until it is tried? How much time is the court to
devote to estimating these figures? How does the court know
whether there will be a trial, even if the motion is denied? And even
if it did take as long to decide a motion for summary judgment as it
would to try the case—an extremely dubious proposition128—is there
anything terribly wrong with that, at least so long as the motion is
granted?
The treatise authors further argue that the timing of the motion
should also be considered by a district court when deciding whether
to deny summary judgment, because “further development of the
case [might be] needed in order to be able to reach its decision.”129
One situation in which this may occur is with respect to a summaryjudgment motion made prior to the close of the pleadings.
Although the motion may be decided at this point, in some
situations completion of the pleadings would serve to clarify the
issues. . . . In a related vein, even after the pleadings are closed
courts have denied summary judgment without prejudice to
renewing the motion after discovery or at trial, a procedure that
occasionally has led to a subsequent grant of the motion. Courts

126. For example, one might start with the economically remarkable nature of the
federal judiciary and the fact that a relatively modest filing fee enables parties to
impose a potentially enormous burden on the system. Perhaps the parties should be
required to bear a larger share of this cost.
127. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 95.
128. For one thing, it should be acknowledged that “[d]efendant’s motions for
summary judgment are far more common than plaintiffs’ motions.” Joe S. Cecil et
al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts,
4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 886 (2007). A defending party typically need prevail
only as to a single element of a claim, thus obviating the need to hear the claiming
party’s entire case. Moreover, aside from oral argument, summary judgment
motions typically are decided on a paper record, which tends to take much less time
to consider than a record produced through live testimony.
129. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 530.
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also have reserved their ruling on a motion for summary judgment
until after the trial of a separate issue. Indeed, when the motion is
pressed for the first time at trial, the court may ignore it and
proceed with the trial.130

It is readily conceded that a court may deny a motion for summary
judgment made at trial, though such a motion makes so little sense it
barely warrants discussion. For in this instance, the discretion to
deny the motion would come not from Rule 56, but from other
sources, as the denial would be based solely on the lateness of the
motion.131 Conversely, what sense does it make to deny a motion for
summary judgment because it was made “too soon”? Is not the
timing of such a motion clearly prescribed in Rule 56(a) and (b)?
And is not this “problem” adequately addressed by Rule 56(f)? In
other words, is not a brief postponement, rather than outright denial
(or postponement until trial), the more appropriate course?132
Moreover, why is it so important to await the responsive pleading,
which typically is regarded as irrelevant in this context?133 And would
not a denial in this context potentially obviate what is often regarded
in practice as a salutary and cost-saving procedure?134

130. Id. at 531 (footnotes omitted).
131. Such a motion, in other words, would be denied summarily, prior to any
consideration of the merits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(E) (empowering the district
courts to issue pretrial orders regarding the “timing of summary adjudication under
Rule 56”). Thus, it seems unlikely such a motion (as well as any renewed motion)
would even be made, as most competent district courts, pursuant to Rule 16, utilize
some form of pretrial scheduling order requiring that motions for summary
judgment be made much sooner. Of course, if for some reason the court were to
consider the motion and decide that it is meritorious, what sense would it make to
deny it as untimely?
132. Cf. 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2740, at 408 (3d ed. 1998) (describing the question “whether a court may
permanently deny a summary-judgment motion and set the case for trial even
though there has been no showing that a genuine issue of fact exists” as “interesting,”
though acknowledging that “[i]n only one early reported case has Rule 56(f) been
relied upon to issue an order of that type”).
133. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2) (providing that a party opposing a motion for
summary judgment “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own
pleading”). Presumably, this would not be the case in the unlikely event that the
defending party admits all or almost all of the allegations in the claiming party’s
pleading, but the lack of a responsive pleading would not prevent the defending
party from making the same admissions at summary judgment (and if that is the
defending party’s intent, the action is likely to settle in any event).
134. Summary judgment is frequently sought early in the proceedings by one or
both parties in actions involving predominantly legal, as opposed to factual, disputes
precisely so that they may achieve a swift resolution at a relatively low cost. For
example, the Supreme Court repeatedly has approved of the use of this procedure in
the area of qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001)
(“Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be
made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided
where the defense is dispositive. . . . As a result, ‘we repeatedly have stressed the
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Finally, the treatise authors observe that Rule 56 authorizes a
district court to make interlocutory summary adjudications and to
enter a partial summary judgment.135 “By using these alternatives to a
total grant or denial of summary judgment,” they argue, “the court is
able to shape the litigation and make certain it progresses in an
orderly fashion.”136 Moreover, “[c]ourts sometimes have exercised
their discretion to deny summary judgment on only a portion of the
case when they feel that a more expeditious approach would be to
adjudicate the entire case at one time.”137
One must agree that Rule 56(d) indeed provides for partial
summary judgment where appropriate, but if a grant of full summary
judgment is justified, how does a grant of partial summary judgment
render the progression of the litigation more “orderly”? And why is
the delayed adjudication of the entire action “at one time” more
“expeditious” than the adjudication of only that portion of the action
that remains in dispute? The answers to these questions are eluding.
Though not cited by the Advisory Committee, additional
arguments in favor of discretionary summary judgment are offered by
Professor Jack H. Friedenthal and Joshua E. Gardner in what appears
to be the leading article on this subject.138 Friedenthal and Gardner
observe that “[i]n considering whether judges should have discretion
to deny an otherwise appropriate motion for summary judgment,
consideration must be given to the policies and purposes served by
summary judgment, concerns of judicial activism, and costs and
benefits to plaintiffs, defendants, and the judiciary.”139 They then
argue that “aggressive use of Rule 56 may unduly burden both the
court and the parties to the case. Preparing, arguing, and ruling
upon summary judgment motions increase litigation costs and
consume judicial resources.”140 In other words, “‘the incorrect use of
the summary judgment procedure obviously increases delay and
expense in the final disposition of litigation and thus aggravates the
very problem the procedure was devised to solve.’”141
There are several possible responses to this argument. First, to the
extent that an “aggressive” use of Rule 56 may be deemed “incorrect,”
importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.’”) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).
135. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at 531–32.
136. Id. at 532.
137. Id.
138. See Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33.
139. Id. at 115.
140. Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. (quoting John A. Bauman, A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J.
467, 467 (1958)).
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it seems that there are already procedures (not to mention monetary
disincentives) in place to deal with that problem.142 Second, as for
the notion that an “incorrect” use of summary judgment causes delay,
this seems highly unlikely in a world where trial dates are assigned
irrespective of what might precede them. The competent district
court will schedule the deadline for motions for summary judgment
far enough in advance of trial so as to avoid any delays of this
nature.143 Third (and most importantly), how do concerns regarding
the “aggressive” or “incorrect” use of Rule 56 justify the denial of a
proper motion for summary judgment? Indeed, how could a proper
motion for summary judgment be deemed “incorrect”?
Friedenthal and Gardner also argue that modern courts “have
recognized an additional, more controversial, use for summary
judgment as a tool to ‘ease docket pressures by enhancing the case
management power of the federal courts.’”144 The meaning of this
argument is not entirely clear; perhaps the idea is that district courts
today are more likely to encourage the use of summary judgment, or
are more inclined to grant summary judgment sua sponte. If that is
the point, then these also seem to be means of promoting litigation
efficiency, if not also fairness. On the other hand, to the extent these
authors are suggesting that district courts, simply to “ease docket
pressures,” are now granting motions for summary judgment that fail
to meet the requirements of Rule 56, this would be an argument for
greater appellate court scrutiny of summary judgment rulings, not
discretionary summary judgment.145

142. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11; see also Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein,
Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 114–18 (1990) (discussing
other possible means of discouraging the unwarranted use of this procedure,
including fee shifting).
143. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing a district court’s
authority to issue pretrial orders to set the schedule for proceeding).
144. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 117 (quoting Robert J. Gregory, One
Too Many Rivers To Cross: Rule 50 Practice in the Modern Era of Summary Judgment, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 689, 704 (1996)); see id. at 104 (“In an atmosphere in which
summary judgment is favored, it appears increasingly important to allow courts
discretion to deny motions that they believe are inappropriate under all of the
circumstances, lest meritorious cases be ‘automatically’ eliminated when they should
have gone to trial.”).
145. The same response may be given to those concerned that this problem might
be confined only to certain areas of the law or to certain litigants. For example, one
legal scholar recently argued that the relatively high rate of summary judgments in
favor of defendants in employment and discrimination cases should cause the courts
to “exercise all discretion in favor of trial.” Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of
Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 777
(2007). But it seems that the better solution is greater awareness of the problem,
coupled (again) with heightened appellate court scrutiny.
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Friedenthal and Gardner further argue that “fears of an increase in
judicial activism seem overstated.”146 Rather,
allowing the trial court discretion to deny summary judgment
constitutes discretion as creativity, a form of institutionally
recognized discretion justifying appellate court deference . . .
[that] is permissible . . . as an exercise of equitable discretion in the
individual case, and therefore does not threaten the preexisting
rule structure. This notion . . . is consistent with the intentions of
the committee that designed the Federal Rules in 1938, and [sic]
consciously chose to leave much to the intelligence, wisdom, and
professionalism of those who would apply the Rules.147

Friedenthal and Gardner add that allowing such discretion over
summary judgment “seems no more threatening than the discretion
judges already exercise in denying an otherwise proper motion for
judgment as a matter of law,” and that “it makes little sense to allow
judges discretion in denying motions in the former category and not
the latter.”148
To rebut these arguments, merely stating that fears of an increase
in judicial activism seem overstated does not mean that discretionary
summary judgment cannot result in an increase in judicial activism or
that such an increase might not in fact occur. Moreover, though the
Advisory Committee that drafted the original Rules might have
incorporated some degree of “equitable discretion,” it should be
recognized that the same committee consciously omitted such
discretion from its version of Rule 56.149
Further, though it does appear that a district court has some
measure of discretion with respect to the resolution of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the discretion inherent in Rule 50 is
limited to the timing of the granting of such a motion.150 A proper
146. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 118.
147. Id. (footnotes and quotation marks omitted).
148. Id. at 118–19 (footnote omitted). Friedenthal and Gardner also analogize
motions for summary judgment to motions for a new trial and for a temporary
restraining order (see id. at 118–19), as well as to criminal sentencing (see id. at 115–
16 n.153), though those examples seem far less apposite.
149. See 1 F.R.D. CXXV–CXXVII (1941) (setting forth original Rule 56).
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) (“If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a
jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the
issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law
against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be
maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.”). Rule 50(b),
which governs renewed motions for judgments as a matter of law, further provides:
If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made
under Rule 50(a), . . . the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as
a matter of law [following trial] and may include an alternative or joint

116

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:85

motion for judgment as a matter of law made pre-verdict properly
may be granted at that juncture, or it may be denied, in which case it
is deemed preserved.151 But if it is denied, and if the jury returns a
verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then a renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law must be granted.152 Generally speaking,
there is no exercise of discretion at this later stage in the proceeding,
lest a gross injustice remains unresolved.153 Thus, summary judgment
(at least formerly) and judgment as a matter of law differ
operationally only in that a final ruling on the latter motion may be
delayed pending the outcome of the trial.154 Under both procedures,
a proper motion ultimately must prevail.155
request for a new trial under Rule 59. In ruling on the renewed motion, the
court may:
(1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict;
(2) order a new trial; or
(3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
151. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1), 50(b). As the Supreme Court explained:
[T]he District Court’s “denial of [a] preverdict motion cannot form the
basis of [an] appeal, because the denial . . . was not error. It was merely an
exercise of the District Court’s discretion, in accordance with the text of the
Rule and the accepted practice of permitting the jury to make an initial
judgment about the sufficiency of the evidence.
Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 406 (2006).
152. See 9 MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 50.06[5][b], at 50-36–37
(3d ed. 2008) (“[A] court must grant judgment as a matter of law if there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant under
controlling law.”) (emphasis added and citations omitted). Admittedly, a renewed
motion need not be granted where the initial motion is made prior to the close of all
the evidence and the nonmoving party’s case somehow improves following the
admission of additional evidence. However, this is a relatively rare occurrence.
153. Consider also that the standard of review for a denial of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law is de novo, see 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 152, § 50.92[1],
at 50-128—meaning (again) that this issue is considered a question of law, and not a
matter left to the discretion of the district court.
154. Actually, it is somewhat unclear why there should be any discretion to deny a
proper pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, despite the fact that such a
denial is only temporary. Indeed, there are indications that this was not always the
recognized practice. See, e.g., Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442,
447 (1871) (“[I]t is settled law that it is error to submit a question to a jury in a case
where there is no evidence upon the subject.”); Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
292, 299 (1835) (“Where there is no evidence tending to prove a particular fact, the
court are bound so to instruct the jury, when requested . . . .”). As explained by the
Improvement Co. Court:
When a prayer for instruction is presented to the court and there is no
evidence in the case to support such a theory it ought always to be denied,
and if it is given, under such circumstances, it is error; for the tendency may
be and often is to mislead the jury by withdrawing their attention from the
legitimate points of inquiry involved in the issue. Nor are judges any longer
required to submit a question to a jury merely because some evidence has
been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the
evidence be of such a character that it would warrant the jury in finding a
verdict in favor of that party. . . . [I]n every case, before the evidence is left to
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the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is
literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can
properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the
onus of proof is imposed.
81 U.S. at 448. Such an approach is not necessarily inconsistent with the text of Rule
50, which could be interpreted as requiring the entry of a proper pre-verdict motion
for judgment as a matter of law, while at the same time preserving for post-trial
reconsideration an erroneous (and interlocutory) denial of such a motion.
The same treatise that endorses discretionary summary judgment justifies the
current practice with respect to judgments as a matter of law as follows:
The court has power under the rule to grant judgment as a matter of
law at the close of the plaintiff’s case. Nevertheless it has been said to be
the better and safer practice to defer a ruling upon the motion until
both sides have finally rested. . . . The exercise of restraint may prevent
the entry of an erroneous judgment.
Even at the close of all the evidence, it may be desirable to refrain
from granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law, despite the fact
that it would be possible for the district court to do so. If judgment as a
matter of law is granted and the appellate court holds that the evidence
in fact was sufficient to go to the jury, an entire new trial must be had.
If, on the other hand, the trial judge submits the case to the jury, even
though he or she thinks the evidence insufficient, final determination of
the case is expedited greatly. If the jury agrees with the trial court’s
appraisal of the evidence, as a matter of law, the case is at an end. If the
jury brings in a different verdict, the trial court can grant a renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Then, if the appellate court
holds that the trial court was in error in its appraisal of the evidence, it
can reverse and order judgment on the verdict of the jury, without any
need for a new trial.
9B ARTHUR R. MILLER & CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2533, at 515-17 (3d ed. 2008) (footnotes and quotation marks omitted). The
current Supreme Court seems to agree.
[W]hile a district court is permitted to enter judgment as a matter of law
when it concludes that the evidence is legally insufficient, it is not
required to do so. To the contrary, the district courts are, if anything,
encouraged to submit the case to the jury, rather than granting such
motions.
Unitherm Food Systems, 546 U.S. at 405.
The pragmatic appeal of this approach is difficult to deny. But there are problems
as well. As Professor Cooper himself once explained:
Direction before the jury has a chance to return a verdict, however,
has advantages which ensure its continued employment. The more
obvious advantages lie in the direction of “efficiency”—the directed
verdict obviates the need for argument, instructions, and what may be a
lengthy jury deliberation. Some cases may call so clearly for a directed
verdict that these advantages easily outweigh the potential advantages of
judgment notwithstanding the verdict . . . . An advantage more difficult
to evaluate is that direction before the jury has had an opportunity to
deliberate changes the nature of the confrontation between judge and
jury. Although the directed verdict is a clear exercise of a control which
might have been avoided by awaiting rendition of the verdict, there is an
offsetting uncertainty whether the control has functioned so as to do
anything more than expedite a result which any jury would inevitably
reach anyway. Judgments notwithstanding the verdict, on the other
hand, place the fact of control in stark relief—the jury’s actual verdict
has been superseded by an exercise of judicial power.
Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55
MINN. L. REV. 903, 903 n.1 (1971). In other words, the granting of a pre-verdict
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Friedenthal and Gardner conclude by arguing that “the costs
associated with discretionary denials of summary judgment can be
outweighed by the benefits to the administration of justice.”156 In
particular, they would require district courts “provide a written
explanation for their denials of technically appropriate motions for
summary judgment.”157 Though “[t]his requirement would clearly
contribute to the workloads of the already overburdened judiciary,”
“the ‘cost’ of a written decision would ultimately result in a ‘benefit’
to litigants in terms of guidance on their case and in a ‘benefit’ to the
judiciary itself in terms of legitimacy.”158
Regrettably for Friedenthal and Gardner, the Rules do not require
an explanation for a discretionary denial of summary judgment.159
But even if they did, it is not at all clear that the benefits of such a
rule would outweigh the costs. It is also unclear that such a rule
would add to the legitimacy of the judiciary. Consider, for example,
how an order of this nature might read:
The Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, and that those facts, as well as the relevant law, favor the
moving party. Nonetheless, because [insert discretionary reason],
the Court concludes that the moving party’s motion for summary
judgment should and will be denied, meaning trial will proceed as
scheduled. Of course, based on the record as it now stands, the
Court has no doubt that the moving party will prevail at that trial.
Indeed, if the evidence proffered at trial were to mirror that
presented in conjunction with this motion, the moving party would
be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

motion for judgment as a matter of law 1) is a ruling on which the district courts are
rarely wrong, 2) has the potential for saving considerable time and money, and 3)
avoids an awkward “reversal” of an erroneous jury verdict. Whether the benefits of
deferring such a decision outweigh these costs is at least debatable.
155. Undoubtedly, an “exception” exists in those situations where the inability to
prove one’s case was caused by the erroneous preclusion of relevant evidence, in
which case a new trial presumably would be the appropriate remedy. Moreover,
there is some precedent (dubious as it might be) for the notion that a plaintiff
lacking sufficient proof might be able to obtain relief pursuant to Rule 41(a), and be
granted a voluntary dismissal, even post-trial. See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.,
386 U.S. 317, 328 (1967) (“A plaintiff whose jury verdict is set aside by the trial court
on defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. v. may ask the trial judge to grant a
voluntary nonsuit to give plaintiff another chance to fill a gap in his proof.”). But
neither of these possible, alternative forms of relief detracts from the general rule.
Cf. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940) (“Each motion, as
the rule recognizes, has its own office.”).
156. Friedenthal & Gardner, supra note 33, at 120.
157. Id. at 122.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 96 (discussing the effect of Rule 52(a)(3)).
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Such an order would provide some guidance to the parties in the
action. Whether it would add to the legitimacy of the federal courts
is another matter.
CONCLUSION
Discretionary summary judgment is but the latest example of the
growing use of discretion in the Rules,160 and the battle over the
proper role of discretion in the Rules is but part of the larger battle
over the proper role of discretion in law generally.161 Though
discretion might have its virtues, it also must be recognized that
discretion “often concentrates unbridled power in few hands, fails to
create clear or predictable guidelines, and permits disparate
treatment of like cases.”162 As one legal scholar explains:
The most prominent drawbacks of discretion hardly need
elaboration. Discretion makes it easier than rules usually do for
decision-makers to consult illegitimate considerations, and it does
nothing to keep them from making “mistakes”. Less prominently,
discretion may have untoward psychological effects on decisionmakers. Discretion is a kind of power, and power corrupts.
Discretionary power seems conducive to an arrogance and
carelessness in dealing with other people’s lives that judges already
have too many incentives to succumb to.163

And regardless of the appropriateness of discretion as to minor
procedural matters, its use is inappropriate when it comes to
160. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—and
the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 193 (2007) (“If
one theme can fairly be said to dominate in the rounds of Civil Rule amendments
adopted since [1982], that theme is the authorization of both numerous specific
measures that district courts can use and the wide discretion they have in pretrial
litigation management.”); see also Bone, supra note 88, at 1962 (“Federal district
judges exercise extremely broad and relatively unchecked discretion over many of
the details of litigation.”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 411
(1982) (discussing the “broad discretion of the trial judge who assumes a managerial
role”).
161. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54 (rev. ed.
1954) (“Almost all of the problems of jurisprudence come down to a fundamental
one of rule and discretion, of administration of justice by law and administration of
justice by the more or less trained intuition of experienced magistrates.”); Bone,
supra note 88, at 1966 (“Determining the optimal degree of discretion is an issue that
pervades all law and legal regulation . . . .”).
162. Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing Complex
Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 300 (1991); see Richard L. Marcus, Slouching
Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1571 (2003) (“The current concern
about procedural discretion is whether unconstrained discretion about procedure
could subvert substantive justice.”).
163. Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer’s View, in THE USES OF
DISCRETION 47, 68 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992); see also Bone, supra note 88, at 1963
(discussing risk of abuse and competency concerns).
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summary judgment. As Professor Redish explains, “[v]esting such
case-by-case discretion in trial courts effectively precludes overall
normative choices on issues that are central to the litigation matrix,”
and “any value that might be served by predictability in procedural
decisionmaking . . . is undermined by ceding so much power over
summary judgment to the district judge in the individual case.”164
Thus, summary judgment, where proper—i.e., where the material
facts are essentially undisputed and the law favors the moving party—
must be granted. Just as with trial itself, there can be no “discretion”
beyond the judgment always inherent in the ascertainment of the
relevant law and the application of law to fact. Stripped of its veneer,
it is an unwillingness to deprive parties of a trial and to devote the
time necessary to decide the issues raised in a motion for summary
judgment that drive the discretionary summary judgment movement.
Yet, neither of these considerations can supply the need for this
doctrine. If the district courts are unwilling to apply this procedure
properly, perhaps its elimination would be the better course.165 But
so long as summary judgment is retained, it must be applied as
designed.
POSTSCRIPT
The Advisory Committee recently proposed sweeping
amendments to Rule 56.166 On August 8, 2008, the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure released proposed
Rule 56 for public comment.167 “After the public comment period,
the proposed amendments will be reconsidered in light of the
comments received.”168 To the extent the amendments finally
approved by the Advisory Committee are approved by the Standing
Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court, they
“will take effect on December 1, 2010, unless Congress affirmatively
acts to defer or reject them.”169

164. Redish, supra note 99, at 1357.
165. At least one legal scholar has advocated precisely that. See generally John
Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (2007).
166. See generally REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (May 9, 2008, as
supplemented June 30, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 REPORT], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV_Report.pdf.
167. See MEMORANDUM TO THE BENCH, BAR, AND PUBLIC ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE FEDERAL RULES (Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
2008-08-Memo_to_Bench_Bar_8_8_08.pdf.
168. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A SUMMARY FOR BENCH AND BAR (August 2008) [hereinafter
SUMMARY], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/Brochure.pdf.
169. Id.
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A substantial portion of the Advisory Committee Report
accompanying proposed Rule 56 is devoted to the issue whether
“should” should be retained, or whether that term should be
replaced by “must.”170 Though proposed Rule 56 retains the use of
“should,” the Advisory Committee clearly is divided on this issue, and
the choice of the proper term seems to be in flux.171
Many of the arguments made by the Advisory Committee in
support of retaining “should” have already been addressed in this
Article. A few responses, though, to those that have not:
The Advisory Committee argues that “should” should be retained
because a change to “must” might signal a change in the “standard
for granting summary judgment”—a matter that the Advisory
Committee has deemed off-limits—rather than the “procedure for
presenting and deciding a summary-judgment motion.”172 But the
argument that the use of “must” might result in a changing of the
standard for granting summary judgment assumes that the choice
between “should” and “must” has some bearing on that issue.
Arguably, it does not, for in either situation, a district court may only
grant the motion if the established standard (no genuine issue as to
any material fact) has been met.
Strictly speaking, the
“should”/“must” issue concerns only the issue whether courts should
be given the discretion to deny a motion that otherwise meets the
established standard. And as to that issue, the Advisory Committee’s
observation that from 1938 to 2007, the Rule said “shall,”173 speaks
volumes. Thus, to the extent the “should”/“must” issue is considered
to be part of the standard for granting summary judgment, the
established standard, at least until 2007, was that an otherwise proper
motion must be granted.
The Advisory Committee also argues that perhaps this issue might
be resolved by using a word (or words) other than “should” or
“must.”174 It seems, though, that, following the Restyle Project, the
Advisory Committee has little choice but to use “must,” “should,” or
170. See 2008 REPORT, supra note 166, at 23-25, 45-46.
171. Indeed, the summary provided by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts states:
Comment is especially sought on whether to retain the current language
carrying forward the present Rule 56 language that a court “should” grant
summary judgment when the record shows that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, recognizing limited discretion to deny summary
judgment in such circumstances.
SUMMARY, supra note 168, at 1-2.
172. 2008 REPORT, supra note 166, at 23.
173. Id. at 45.
174. See id. at 24.
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“may.” And as even the Advisory Committee believes that “may” does
not accurately reflect the pre-restyle meaning of this provision, it
further seems that the Advisory Committee has little choice but to
decide which term—“should” or “must”—is the more appropriate
term in this context.
Finally, the Advisory Committee argues that although a proper
motion for summary judgment might have to be granted in some
actions (such as those involving a valid official immunity defense),
the discretion to deny such a motion should remain in others.175 But
this approach would take Rule 56 down a non-transsubstantive road it
ought not go. If an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment
must be granted in some cases, that is simply evidence that it must be
granted in all. Both the goose and the gander are entitled to the
same sauce; indeed, Rule 56, even today, provides no less.

175.

See id. at 46.
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APPENDIX A—
FORMER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56**
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor
upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party.
A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served
at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this
rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and the trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of
the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount
of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly.
** The version of Rule 56 reproduced here is the version that was in effect
immediately prior to the effective date of the restyle amendments, December 1,
2007. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 2. To
the extent current Rule 56 is deemed inapplicable, this version presumably would
control. See infra note *** (describing the effective date of the restyled Rules).
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(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of
all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the
adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the
party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may
make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
employing them to pay the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the
other party to incur, including reasonable attorney’s fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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APPENDIX B—
CURRENT FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56***
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
(a) By a Claiming Party. A party claiming relief may move, with or
without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part
of the claim. The motion may be filed at any time after:
(1) 20 days have passed from commencement of the action; or
(2) the opposing party serves a motion for summary judgment.
(b) By a Defending Party. A party against whom relief is sought
may move at any time, with or without supporting affidavits, for
summary judgment on all or part of the claim.
(c) Serving the Motion; Proceedings. The motion must be served at
least 10 days before the last day set for the hearing. An opposing
party may serve opposing affidavits before the hearing day. The
judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on the Motion.
(1) Establishing Facts. If summary judgment is not rendered
on the whole action, the court should, to the extent
practicable, determine what material facts are not genuinely at
issue. The court should so determine by examining
the
pleadings and evidence before it and by interrogating the
attorneys. It should then issue an order specifying what
facts—including items of damages or other relief—are not
genuinely at issue. The facts so specified must be treated as
established in the action.
(2) Establishing Liability. An interlocutory summary judgment
may be rendered on liability alone, even if there is a genuine
issue on the amount of damages.
(e) Affidavits; Further Testimony.
(1) In General. A supporting or opposing affidavit must be
made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be
admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent
to testify on the matters stated. If a paper or part of a paper is
referred to in an affidavit, a sworn or certified copy must be
*** This restyled version of Rule 56 “shall take effect on December 1, 2007, and
shall govern in all proceedings thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and
practicable, all proceedings then pending.” Order Amending the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, supra note 2.
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attached to or served with the affidavit. The court may permit
an affidavit to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or additional affidavits.
(2) Opposing Party’s Obligation to Respond. When a motion
for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an
opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in
its own pleading; rather, its response must—by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule—set out specific facts showing
a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not
so
respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be
entered against that party.
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. If a party opposing the
motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may:
(1) deny the motion;
(2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained,
depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken;
or
(3) issue any other just order.
(g) Affidavit Submitted in Bad Faith. If satisfied that an affidavit
under this rule is submitted in bad faith or solely for delay, the
court must order the submitting party to pay the other party the
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, it incurred as a
result. An offending party or attorney may also be held in
contempt.

